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Case Notes
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PROCEDURE-The Issue of Com-
parative Carrier Selection Was Deleted by the CAB from the Hear-
ing on Public Convenience and Necessity, Accomplishing Partial
Deregulation. Oakland Service Case, CAB Orders No. 78-4-121
(April 19, 1978) and 78-9-96 (September 21, 1978).
The Port of Oakland, California, and the Oakland Chamber of
Commerce filed a petition on April 6, 1977, requesting the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB, also referred to as "the Board") to
investigate the need for additional or replacement commercial
scheduled air passenger service between Oakland and twenty-two
major American cities.' The case, called a service investigation,
was instituted by order of the Board.' Simultaneous applications
by six carriers' for authority to operate between Oakland and the
points named were consolidated with Oakland's petition.' In the
five-month interim between the instituting order and the second
order,' described below, the Board authorized multiple minor ad-
justments among the parties to the proceedings for the purpose of
facilitating the Board's adjudication of Oakland's service. Six
markets were deleted as duplications of route proceedings already
pending before the Board.! Miscellaneous representatives of other
ICAB Docket No. 30699 (July 12, 1978), pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 302.701
(1978).
2 These cities were: Albuquerque, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas/Fort
Worth, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami/
Ft. Lauderdale, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Port-
land, Reno, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Washington/Baltimore.
3 CAB Order No. 78-4-121 (April 19, 1978) [hereinafter cited as First Order].
4The carriers were: Allegheny Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 30739; Braniff
Airways, Inc., CAB Docket No. 30819; Frontier Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No.
30862; Hughes Air Corp., d/b/a Hughes Airwest, CAB Docket Nos. 30863 and
31583; Northwest Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 30981; Texas International Air-
lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 30866.
5The consolidation was done pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 302.915(b) (1978),
under the style Oakland Service Case.
6 CAB Order No. 78-9-96 (September 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Second
Order].
7 The markets eliminated were: New York and Washington/Baltimore in the
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governmental bodies and agencies, air lines, chambers of com-
merce, and the general public filed comments, participated in oral
argument, or were granted leave to intervene.8 One carrier was
added,9 the Los Angeles market was rejoined in the proceedings
notwithstanding the intrastate character of the route, and Seattle
and Portland were combined as co-terminals."
In instituting the Oakland service investigation, the Board
adopted a presumption that public convenience and necessity re-
quired additional service to each named market,"5 and announced a
tentative policy to award certificates of convenience and necessity
to all carriers found fit, willing, and able to perform such service."
The first order concluded with an outline of a series of hearings,
each to generate a separate formal order by the Board, in order
to dispose of the issues raised by the investigation of Oakland
service. The first hearing was limited to the subject of the policy
determination proposed in the instituting order, that is, elimination
of comparative carrier selection."' Formulated in notice and com-
ment style," the hearing itself was designed to be procedurally less
Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 30356; Las
Vegas and Reno in the California-Nevada Low Fare Route Proceeding, CAB
Docket No. 31574; Miami-Ft. Lauderdale in the Miami-Los Angeles Low-Fare
Case, CAB Docket No. 31976; and St. Louis in the St. Louis-Louisville and San
Francisco Bay Area Nonstop Case, CAB Docket No. 31491.
' See generally Second Order, supra note 6. A complete list was not memorial-
ized in either order, but among those whose arguments were summarized in the
Second Order were: Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Cali-
fornia Public Utility Commission, the City and County of San Francisco, the
Texas Aeronautics Commission, the City of Houston, and the Houston Chamber
of Commerce.
'See Second Order, supra note 6, at 1. That carrier was Ozark Air Lines, Inc.,
no docket number.
10 The theory was that although the Los Angeles market already received ex-
tensive nonstop low fare service by an intrastate carrier beyond the regulation of
the CAB, First Order, supra note 3, at 2, the findings apply to the Los Angeles
market nevertheless. Second Order, supra note 6, at 2.
"Second Order, supra note 6, at 2.
12 First Order, supra note 3, at 17-18, concluding an exhaustive review of de-
mand potential at Oakland.
1i Id. at 19. "Fit, willing, and able" are statutory crietria. See note 28, infra,
and accompanying text.
"First Order, supra note 3, at 57.
'" See Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. S 553 (1976), which pre-
scribes the procedure for informal rulemaking by administrative agencies.
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formal than the evidentiary style' usually required by the Board."
The order resulting from the first hearing contained an analysis of
arguments submitted by the many interested parties regarding the
proposed permissive award policy, and a statement of the Board's
policy innovation sufficient to constitute notice to the public and
to the industry of the imminent change." Held: the issue of com-
parative carrier selection was deleted by the CAB from the hearing
on public convenience and necessity, accomplishing partial de-
regulation.
The Board conceived Oakland Service as a pattern for its own
conduct of future proceedings where routes are contested." With-
out doubt, the case has already fulfilled that function."0 The broad
import of the case, however, will be measured by its impact on
other administrative agencies, and on the future existence and
nature of Board function, as well as in the growth of the air pas-
senger industry and in service to the consumer. In an age when
administrative agencies appear to be single-minded in their asser-
tion of expanded legislative authority, Oakland Service is a wel-
come respite. Indeed, Oakland Service, in that respect at least, is
a model of agency self-control.
Since the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,1 the CAB and its
predecessor' have exercised absolute administrative control over
10 See Administraitve Procedure Act §§ 7-8, 5 U.S.C. S 556-57 (1976), which
prescribes the procedure for formal rulemaking by administrative agencies.
17 See 14 C.F.R. § 302.3 (1978) for the Board's requirements. An evidentiary
hearing closely resembles a trial with all the usual accoutrements: pleadings,
cross-examination, motions, and a record, but without the strict standards of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Whether such formal adjudicatory proceedings are
required for any or all of an agency's rulemaking depends upon the provisions of
the statute under which the agency operates.
"See First Order, supra note 3, at 64. The second and third hearing, on the
economic and fitness issues, were to be conducted in the usual evidentiary format,
but due to the pervasive nature of the policy finalized by the first hearing, they
became somewhat pro forma, and are not the subject of this analysis.
"Chicago-Midway Expanded Service Proceeding, CAB Order No. 78-7-41
(July 12, 1978), at 2.
SoSee, e.g., Houston Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 78-8-172 (August
30, 1978), Improved Authority to Wichita Case, CAB Order No. 78-12-106
(December 14, 1978), and Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding, CAB
Order No. 79-1-75 (January 11, 1979).
21 Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), now codified in Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §S 1301 et seq. (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938].
22 The Civil Aeronautics Authority became the CAB in 1940. Presidential Re-
organization Plan No. IV, April 11, 1940.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
route entry authority.' Recognized as the cornerstone of economic
regulation of routes,' the "certificate of public convenience and
necessity"' has been a mandatory statutory prerequisite to carrier
service on every city-pair market." To this extent, control over
route entry is not subject to the discretion of the Board.
Congress provided little guidance" for the exercise of such
broad authority, but did prescribe issuance of the certificate to
the applicant carrier whom the Board finds "fit, willing, and able
to perform such transportation properly, and to conform to the
provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements
of the Authority thereunder."" The 1938 Congress enhanced this
minimal guidance only by prefacing the Act with a Declaration of
Policy" which requires the Authority to consider as being in the
'Subject to judicial review under § 1006(a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, supra note 21, and § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§5 702-706 (1976).
24 A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw 1-12 (1974). It is axiomatic that competition
in other areas, such as rates and service, is only illusory where the threat of route
entry by additional carriers is precluded by government regulation. CIVIL AERO-
NAUTICS BOARD, REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY REFORM
126 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STAFF REPORT].
S2 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, supra note 21, Title IV; see A. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAw 1-12 (1974).
28 49 U.S.C. S 401(a). "The major significance of the CAB's use of the
certification powers is now, as it has always been, to determine the amount of
competition that will be allowed in the airline industry." E. REDFORD, THE
REGULATOR PROCESS 147 (1969).
27 It has been said that the only goal was to protect and nurture the infant air
transportation industry. Comment, An Examination of Traditional Arguments on
Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 187, 205 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Examination of Arguments].
2849 U.S.C. S 401(d)(1) (1976).
29 ld. at § 2, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2. In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties
under this Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among
other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the for-
eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate
transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
CASENOTES
public interest "[c]ompetition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system."'
The Congress of 1958 neglected the opportunity to clarify the
intent of the earlier version of the Declaration of Policy regarding
competition on routes. In drafting the Federal Aviation Act of
1958," they reenacted pertinent portions of the 1938 statute virt-
ually intact, while disclaiming any approval of CAB interpreta-
tions." As for the Declaration of Policy, Congress again included
it as their "Declaration of Policy: The Board" adding but one word
of substance.'
Prior to the Oakland Service Case, the award of a certificate of
convenience and necessity climaxed a discretionary procedure
known as "comparative carrier selection."' In the initial phase,
the Board inquired into the public need for service on the subject
city-pair route," considering an analysis of past traffic, operating
performance of current carriers, and growth potential.' Finding
public need, the Board turned to the task of selecting the carrier
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best
promote its development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
I01d. § 2(d). Although such competition is only one of six stated policy
objectives, the statement offers no priority system to govern those situations where
individual objectives may be antithetical.
1172 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976), formerly Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
3H.R. REP. No. 2556, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1958).
1 The word "promotion" appears along with "encouragement and develop-
ment" for the first time in § 102(f), 49 U.S.C. S 1302(f) (1976). Compare with
S 2(f) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 quoted at note 29 supra.
"First Order, supra note 3, at 53-55. The author has found no reference to
this term in the scholarly commentaries. This illustrates the inherent difficulty in
researching CAB policy, which has been systematically interred in orders conse-
quent to miscellaneous service investigations. See generally N. TANEJA, THE
COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 153 (1976). While comparative carrier selection
has existed for more than two decades, the term itself may have been coined by
the current Board.
IN. TANEJA, supra note 34, at 154.
36Id.
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or carriers to serve the route. These proceedings were invariably
marked by the tedium and minutia of the lengthy testimony and
numerous exhibits necessary to each carrier competing for the
route, who was charged with proving not only his own competence,
but his superiority to each other competitor as well."
In the past the Board considered such evidence as an applicant's
size, financial resources, equipment inventory, and proposed operat-
ing strategy as well as less tangible factors such as potential diver-
sion from existing carriers or an applicant's historical interest in
the route.8 The route was analyzed for consistency with the appli-
cant's existing route system as well as its integration into the route
system of the nation. International routes were considered separ-
ately from domestic routes, which were further distinguished as
trunk-line (routes between major cities) or feeder (local) service."
Such a catalogue of policy standards in route entry cases is engag-
ing, but not a reliable indicator of future Board action
due to the fact that the Board, using the same policy criteria, has
sometimes arrived at very different decisions in cases involving
similar routes and similar situations. . . . Because there is no
mathematical formula, the Board is forced to decide the weight to
be attached to each consideration for each particular case.'
In sum, the procedure now known as "comparative carrier selec-
tion" was the mechanism by which the Board pre-empted the
marketplace in designating which carrier or carriers could serve
each market more consistently with the objectives of the Act."
Whether the statutory language contemplated comparative car-
rier selection has been the subject of debate since the law was
passed. The legislative history of the Act relative to competition
on routes supports a variety of hypotheses. One contemporary of
the 1938 legislators attributed to them a "natural-monopoly" an-
alysis that "[e]veryone agreed that economic and safety regulation
was imperative and that it should follow the traditional lines of
87 First Order, supra note 3, at 55.
18 N. TANEJA, supra note 34, at 154.
191d. at 155.
40 Id. at 153.
4" First Order, supra note 3, at 34; see also 40 Fed. Reg. 28,723, 28,748
(1975).
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other public utility regulation,""2 while another observed that Con-
gress enacted the legislation while assuring itself that "freedom of
entry and healthy competition would be maintained under the new
system." A third analysis suggests that Congress was so pre-
occupied with details of organization, financing the industry, and
questions of executive versus legislative control of the new agency
that any consideration of economic regulation was superficial if
not tacit." Further, one must question whether any reference to
competition in 1938 is relevant to the contemporary form of
competition; the "destructive competition" known to and feared by
the 1938 Congress was in reality competitive bidding, termed
"destructive" when outrageously low. '
Internal CAB interpretations of the Act's reference to compe-
tition have vacillated. An early interpretation allowing competi-
tion to the extent necessary to carry out the policy goals of the
Act0 evolved into a presumption in favor of competition, expressed
by the Board in optimistic terms:
The greatest gain from competition, whether actual or potential,
is the stimulus to devise and experiment with new operating tech-
niques and new equipment, to develop new means of acquiring and
promoting business, including the rendering of better service to
the customer and to the Nation and affording the Government a
comparative yardstick by which the performance of the carriers
may be measured. Competition invites comparison as to equipment,
costs, personnel, methods of operation, solicitation of traffic, all
41 R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 403 (1941).
"Yet the Civil Aeronautics Act contains nothing of the usual arrangement in
public-utility regulation: a guarantee to franchised firms of the right to earn a
'fair return on a fair value' of property dedicated to the public service." R.
CAVES, Ant TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 138 (1962).
43Examination of Arguments, supra note 27, at 199 (citing Memorandum Sub-
mitted by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney with Respect to the Right of Entry in
Air Transportation Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, in Hearings Before the Anti-
trust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sass., at
926 (1956)).
"4See Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote To The Legislative History of
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 309
(1967).
4' See R. CAVES, supra note 42, at 124; compare with First Order, supra note 3,
at 24, n.33: "The bidders' behavior was in fact quite rational, although specula-
tive." See generally A. LOWENFELD, supra note 24, at 1-12.
1 Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 63, 66 (1940).
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JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of which tend to assure the development of an air transportation
system as contemplated by the Act."
By 1951 the Board had reformulated its presumption into one
against competition by adopting standards of proof of market need
so rigorous' that the dissenting member was prompted to com-
plain that "[t]he majority decision in this case continues and ex-
tends a monopoly over one of the heaviest route segments in the
country."'
9
Even when the Board attempted to relax restrictions in favor
of competition, the more liberal regulations were foreclosed by
judicial mandate. For example, when a Circuit Court disallowed
exemption of supplemental carriers from certification require-
ments, an alternate scheme of issuing "supplemental certificates"
was likewise blocked by court action. The action was initiated by
trunk-line carriers threatened by the liberalization of Board policies
regarding competition."
Recent judicial authority, however, again favors competition,
holding that "when sufficient traffic exists to support competition,
certification of competing carriers is mandated by the Act as
providing the best means of effectuating the other public interest
goals contained in § 102."' This decision hobbled the theoretical
"Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 103-04 (1946); see also Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943).
"Southern Service to the West Case, 12 C.A.B. 518, 534 (1951). The ma-
jority described the burden of showing a need for competition as "present[ing]
to the applicant a major, if not insurmountable, task . I..." d. at 535.
"'Id. at 582 (Lee, Member, dissenting opinion) (Emphasis in original).
"American Airlines v. C.A.B., 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 905 (1957).
51 United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 278 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated
sub nom. All American Airways, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 297
(1960).
"Continental Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 519 F.2d 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). This case culminated a struggle of nearly eight
years over certification on the San Diego-Denver route, arising out of an appli-
cation by United Air Lines on January 12, 1967, for permission to provide non-stop
service on several San Diego markets. The appeal was heard by Circuit Judges
Leventhal and Wright, and District Judge Weigel, who found support for their
analysis of the role of competition in "the particular respect due a 'contemporary
construction of a statute by men charged with the responsibility of setting its ma-
chinery in motion'" id. at 954-55, and from the consistency in the Board's own
position on route competition in the past. Id. at 955. In finding such consistency,
this three-judge panel ignored Southern Service to the West Case, 12 C.A.B. 518
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foundation of the Board's policy of comparative carrier selection;
its influence on subsequent Board policy may not be ignored.
By the time Oakland petitioned for improved service, the Board
policy of comparative carrier selection was so well entrenched"
that entry into trunk-line service was effectively denied to new
carriers"' and the entire nation was served by a route system based
on an elaborate network of cross-subsidized city-pair markets.'
Not surprisingly, metropolitan Oakland had been all but neglected
and was substantially dependent upon San Francisco International
Airport for air service." To effect a remedy the Board had at its
(1951), and discounted the Board's recent freeze on routes since it was not articu-
lated as a "fundamental change in policy." 519 F.2d at 955.
5 Comparative carrier selection was subject to exception as early as 1955. The
board canvassed prior actions in route awards as well as ancillary air services,
such as freight forwarders and tour operators, for evidence that abandonment of
comparative carrier selection may not be considered an abrupt 180 degree policy
maneuver. First Order, supra note 3, at 46.
"Not one new trunk-line carrier has been certified since 1938 while the 16
carriers "grandfathered" under S 401(e)(1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq., have been reduced to 10 as a result of merger. A. LOWEN-
FELD, supra note 25, at 1-17 n.b. Ninety-four such applications for trunk-line
authority have been denied. SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 49 n.1
(1975). See note 55 infra, for the economic significance of trunk-line authority,
which is generally more profitable than feeder service.
"' Cross-subsidy was explained in testimony before a Senate Subcommittee as
follows:
Each carrier has a complex route system made up of markets
which vary widely in their profit potential. At one end of the spec-
trum are markets which have the potential to be extremely lucrative
if the carrier's operations are protected from competition. At the
other extreme lies a group of markets in which the carrier's opera-
tions are unprofitable. Under the present regulatory scheme, each
carrier is pictured as willingly shouldering the burden of serving
these unprofitable markets because the Board allows it, as a quid
pro quo, to earn extra profits in its rich markts. This is accom-
plished by setting fares in the rich markets at a level in excess of
costs (including a normal return on capital) and by keeping out
competition.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Comm. on the Judiciary of the Senate, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1216 (1975) (state-
ment of George C. Eads).
Available economic data support both Oakland's request for im-
proved service and our finding that the current pattern of service in
the San Francisco area is causing inconvenience to millions of air
travelers. The East Bay contains 40.6 percent of the total Bay area
population and, considered as a separate economic unit, the East
Bay area would rank 16th, 15th, 16th, and 18th nationally in terms
of population, effective buying income, buying power index, and
retail sales, respectively. Moreover, the results of the Bay Area
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disposal authority based on an elderly Act designed to protect an
infant industry, which had supported a wide variety of Board
policies over a period of forty years." With little manipulation,
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as originated in the Act of 1938,
became the statutory authority for the latest and most liberal of
the Board policies of economic regulation: the multiple permissive
route award.
While the contemporary approach adopted in Oakland Service
may be dismissed as merely an "idea whose time has come"" or a
necessary adjunct to the maturing of an industry,"' the majority
left no element of their innovation to chance. The Board's own
discussion of its reasons for adopting the "novel and experimental
procedure"'" amounts to arguments which may be summarized as
a) from the law, b) from policy, and c) from necessity.
Necessity was discussed first in the form of a generalized expla-
nation for the announcement of new policy at the commencement
of proceedings rather than at the conclusion." Without abdicating
responsibility for carrier selection, a service investigation of the
magnitude proposed for Oakland would have been admittedly un-
thinkable "because a conventional route proceeding covering all
15 Oakland markets would take an inordinate length of time to
complete, and would overtax our hearing and analytical re-
sources. '"' Yet to reduce the number of markets for the purpose
of manageability and speed would compromise the opportunity of
the Oakland carriers to generate a mutually supportive pool of
connecting traffic.'
Metropolitan Transportation Commission's 1975 survey of departing
passengers at the three Bay area airports show that the East Bay
area generates 25 percent of the total Bay area traffic using sched-
uled services, and that 17 percent of the traffic at SFO originates
or terminates in the East Bay area. This last figure translates into
2.7 million East Bay passengers who are using an airport less con-
venient than OAK.
First Order, supra note 3, at 4-5.
5, See notes 46-52, supra and the accompanying text.
"See notes 80-81, infra and the accompanying text.
"First Order, supra note 3, at 21.
0Id. at 3.
61 Id. at 19-20.
1I Id. at 20.
63 Id.
CASENOTES
Having justified their timing as an issue of sheer necessity, the
Board expanded its argument in a tactic, either by design or acci-
dent, which effectively anticipated and disarmed each major ob-
jection of the opponents of deregulation. Additionally, the majority
reformulated the hearing on the issue of the new procedure in
notice and comment style, discarding the more rigorous evidentiary
format!" with its adversary proceedings and opportunities for cross-
examination, and left the pro-regulators a chance merely to com-
ment on their dismantled arguments."
Secondly, the Board defined its radical departure from precedent
by arguing policy considerations, attributing to the 1938 Congress
the intent that the Board adapt to changing economic conditions:
We would be faithless to our trust if, through timidity or an un-
thinking adherence to precedents based on facts which no longer
exist, we set a vital and burgeoning industry on the same path to
obsolescence and decline which has been trodden by some other
industries whose regulators did not dare to innovate as conditions
changed."
Finally the Board argued from the statute, confronting the issue
of destructive competition, which was admittedly feared by the
1938 Congress,"' and unambiguously addressed in the Declaration
of Policy." In describing the contemporary mode of destructive
competition, the Board exposed a fundamental policy change, that
"we cannot agree to define healthy competition as that state where
the fortunes of the competitors fluctuate but no competitor ever
goes to the wall. '" ' To this, the Board footnoted a self-laudatory
claim that past regulation has not protected carriers from forced
"See generally A. LOWENFELD, supra note 24, at 1-101 to 1-150. In U.S. v.
Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), the Supreme Court found no
intrinsic requirement for adjudicatory proceedings unless the act under which
the agency operated provided that hearings must be "on the record." The Civil
Aeronautics Act contains no such "magic ingredients," which is not surprising
in that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 preceded the Administrative Procedure
Act, passed in 1946. Without formal adjudicatory proceedings the factual bases
for agencies' conclusions are not available for cross-examination, nor exposed
to review on appeal.
"See Second Order, supra note 6, at Appendix A.
46First Order, supra note 3, at 21.
"See H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); S. REP. No. 1661,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
8 Quoted at note 29, supra.
69First Order, supra note 3, at 25.
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acquisitions but has spared them bankruptcy." The Board con-
tinued by describing four possible types of destructive competition.
Three of these were discounted as unusual circumstances,' and the
fourth-predatory behavior by a powerful competitor-was con-
sidered controllable under current statutory authority." The de-
structive competition argument was concluded with citation to
unregulated intrastate markets and lightly regulated segments of
the industry, such as freight forwarders, as models of competitive
response to relaxed regulation."'
The Board's argument then shifted from the defensive to the
offensive with a discussion of the new-found role of the marketplace.
Mistrust of the effects of market forces has not been a traditional
argument against deregulation,"' but appears to be a pivotal issue
in the dissent on the Board:
I can't get over the feeling that we are imparting near human
attributes of insight, rationality, and purposefulness to the market,
and I can't accept the proposition that such an impersonal agent
will do the job with the same dedication to the public interest, with
the same accountability, and with the same respect for due process
that we as appointed officials have been called upon to demonstrate
for nearly forty years."'
The majority argued that the forces of the marketplace pull in
directions similar to the objective criteria of comparative carrier
selection," but are capable of doing so continuously, finely tuning
their sensitive mechanisms to current circumstances rather than the
episodic manipulations of the Board which respond only to "past
facts embalmed in the evidentiary record."" The Board then re-
70 Id. at 25 n.35; compare Gritta, Profitability and Risk in Air Transports
A Case for Deregulation, 7 TRANS. L. J. 197, 203-04 (1975).
,' The unusual circumstances were described as 1) irretrievable commission
of long-lived, immobile capital to a depressed market, 2) management charac-
terized by lack of sophistication or motives other than profit maximization, and
3) irrational market behavior typified by imprudent entry as well as by failure to
withdraw from an unprofitable market. First Order, supra note 3, at 25-27.
'1d. at 25.
7 Id. at 31.
" See generally Examination of Arguments, supra note 27.
' Second Order, supra note 6 (O'Melia, Member, Interim Statement).
76 See note 38, supra and accompanying text.
"First Order, supra note 3, at 34.
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iterated its interpretation of the Act under which it found authority
for its innovative posture.
By the time the notice and comment hearing on the proposed
procedure was accomplished, the arguments offered by the parties
were neatly categorized as 1) legal objections to certificating more
carriers than a market can support, 2) legal objections to permis-
sive certification at Oakland, 3) economic (policy) objections to
multiple permissive certification in any situation, 4) economic
(policy) objections to multiple certification in any situation other
than Oakland, 5) economic (policy) objections to failure to apply
multiple permissive certification in all situations, 6) objections to
environmental procedures, and 7) complete accord with the order. 8
The Board's rebuttal to the comments submitted included citation
to the arguments and evidence in the instituting order with an
occasional original reference. Only the environmental topics were
new. Without further proceedings, the Board made its revolution-
ary policy final.
The Oakland Service Case is not remarkable for the fact that
deregulation of route entry" was accomplished. Indeed, deregula-
tion was inevitable. Every administration since that of John Ken-
nedy has espoused such a relaxation of governmental control in
some form. The prevailing temper of the judiciary, as evidenced
by Continental Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B.,8' has naturally reinforced
this inevitability. Less than two months after the second Board
order on Oakland Service the Congress passed the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978," making now academic any question of Board
propriety.
78 Second Order, supra note 6, at 2.
7 8Deregulation is used here in the popular sense of removing economic protec-
tion, such as proscribing competition or controlling rates in the public utility style;
no current advocate of deregulation seriously proposes exception from antitrust,
labor, or safety regulations nor from regulation to ensure adherence to tariffs,
financial responsibility or maintenance of schedules. SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra
note 24, at ii.
'o SPECIAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 7-12.
81 519 F. 2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). See
note 52, supra and accompanying text.
82 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, to be codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. The Act amends the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1958, estab-
lishing specific programs for increased competition under a revised policy state-
ment, including liberalized carrier entry into new markets and reduced control
over fares.
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What is worthy of memorial, in view of the public attention
which legitimately accompanies federal legislation, is that the
impetus for the abandonment of comparative carrier selection by
the Board was internal. One can only imagine the herculean effort
required to orchestrate the overruling of such a precedent where
the ultimate effect may well be "sunset" for the Board itself." To
accomplish this, the Board was forced to rely on its authority under
an Act which was, if not obsolete, at least unequal to the task of
regulating an industry so vigorous, an Act further handicapped by
ambiguous intent and conflicting policy objectives.
Eclipsed by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978," the Oakland
Service Case has received precious little attention, but it has raised
two vital issues which must now be considered with the imple-
mentation of the latest Act: 1) what shall be the criteria and
parameters of fitness, willingness, and ability, the only threshhold
for route entry which remains intact,"3 and 2) whether there now
exists any function for the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Paula Brown Sinclair
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AIRPORT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
-Congress Appropriated Private Air Carriers to Aid in the Gov-
ernment's Air Transportation Security Program, Thereby Sup-
planting any Common Law Power of Search Air Carriers May
Have Had, and Subjecting Such Searches to the Fourth Amend-
ment's Standard of Reasonableness. United States v. Fannon, 556
83In an interesting parallel allusion Member O'Melia charged that "[t]he staff
on its own prepared the order to adopt the multiple permissive award policy, and
the Board gave its blessing to it at its 'Sunshine' meeting of September 7. This
makes it all too evident that the policy decision to use multiple permissive awards
was made elsewhere and at an earlier time." Second Order, supra note 6, Interim
Statement at 2.
"See note 82, supra.
85See note 28, supra and accompanying text. This has led Member O'Melia to
complain that "the operating authority is entitled a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity, and not a fit, willing and able certificate, or anything
else." Seattle/Portland-Japan Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 78-10-42 (July
6, 1978) (O'Melia, Member, dissenting opinion) at 2.
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F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearing en banc granted, 569 F.2d
1106 (1978).
Acting in concert in March of 1976, the defendants deposited
at an airline freight office two packages for shipment. Due to the
defendants' hesitation and nervousness, employees of the carrier
suspected the packages contained drugs and, when defendants left
the freight office, opened the packages and found heroin. They
then turned the drugs over to federal law enforcement officers.
The defendants were indicted and tried jointly. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to suppress the use of the drugs as
evidence,' finding that since no government authorities had par-
ticipated, the search by the freight agents was in fact a private
search and therefore not governed by the fourth amendment.
Upon conviction of multiple counts of violating federal narcotics
and conspiracy laws,2 the defendants appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, assigning as the principal
error the district court's denial of their motion to suppress the
drugs as evidence. Held, Reversed and Remanded: Congress ap-
propriated private air carriers to aid in the government's air trans-
portation security program,' thereby supplanting any common law
1 556 F.2d at 963. The opinion of the district court is not reported.
221 U.S.C. 5 841 (1976):
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; . . .
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976):
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed
for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the con-
spiracy.
349 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976):
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, require any air carrier,
intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier to refuse to transport-
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his person,
as prescribed in section 1356(a) of this title, to determine whether
he is unlawfully carrying a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other
destructive substance, or
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to a search
or inspection of such property to determine whether it unlawfully
contains a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive sub-
stance.
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the Ad-
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power of search air carriers may have had, and subjecting such
searches to the fourth amendment's standard of reasonableness.
United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearing
en banc granted, 569 F.2d 1106 (1978).
The fourth amendment" protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply only to action by the federal govern-
ment.' The origin and history of the fourth amendment show it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign author-
ity, and not as a limitation upon nongovernmental agencies." A
purely private search is therefore not governed by the fourth
amendment's standard of reasonableness. In Burdeau v. McDowell,'
for instance, the Supreme Court found the amendment is not
violated by a private corporation's seizure of papers from the pos-
session of a director and an employee.!
Conduct that is formally "private" may, however, become so
ministrator, any such carrier may also refuse transportation of a
passenger or property when, in the opinion of the carrier, such
transportation would or might be inimical to safety of flight.
(b) Any agreement for the carriage of persons or property in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation by an air carrier,
intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier for compensation or hire
shall be deemed to include an agreement that such carriage shall
be refused when consent to search such persons or inspect such
property for the purposes enumerated in subsection (a) of this
section is not given.
' The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1974); Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28 (1927); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); See, e.g., Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
Through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the same re-
straints against unreasonable searches and seizures are enforceable against the
states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 8 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963).
' Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
7id.
8 Id. at 476. Although there is no constitutional violation, an action of replevin
would lie against both the thief and the receiver of the stolen goods to recover
the private papers. Id. at 468. See also United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767 (8th
Cir. 1977), where the court held that a common carrier's routine opening of
packages when the consignee cannot be located is a private search not subject to
the fourth amendment, until federal agents joined the search.
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entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action Such involvement has been
found to exist where a bus line is operated under the regulatory
supervision of a federal governmental agency which is taking an ac-
tive role in the line's day to day operations." Similarly, the Supreme
Court has held that private individuals or groups endowed by the
state with governmental powers or functions are state agencies or
instrumentalities and subject to constitutional limitations.1 While
sufficient governmental involvement in private activity may trigger
fourth amendment protections, the Supreme Court has stressed it
is no part of the policy" of the fourth amendment to discourage
9Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299 (1966); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462
(1952); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401
(1950). Cf., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (a state law which author-
ized private discrimination unconstitutionally encouraged and involved the state
in private discrimination); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (a state's
regulation of its electoral process in a form which permits a private organiza-
tion to practice racial discrimination is State action in violation of the fifteenth
amendment).
10In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), the agency
regulating transit operations in the District of Columbia received complaints
about radio broadcasts of music and commercials aboard buses. The agency in-
vestigated the broadcasts and after hearings concluded public safety, comfort,
and convenience were not impaired. The Supreme Court held that governmental
involvement was sufficient to invoke constitutional protections, but that any in-
vasion of privacy was not unreasonable.
"t Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). Under a private will, a city was
named the trustee of a park that was to remain racially segregated. Unable to
legally enforce racial segregation, the city resigned as trustee and had three in-
dividuals named instead, in order to effectuate the testator's intent. The Court
held the individuals were performing a public function and were subject to the
fourth amendment.
12 "[T]he fourth amendment was directed against specific historical evils,
'searches' and 'seizures' in the sense of forcible official entries into homes and
offices to ransack the owners' drawers and closets under general warrants and
writs of assistance .. " Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 362 (1974).
To effectuate the amendment's prime purpose of deterring future unlawful
police conduct, evidence that is illegally seized is excluded from trial. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974); Boarde, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Com-
parative Study of a Classic Mismatch 11, 52 TEx. L. REV. 621, 646-47 (1974).
But the fruits of private illegal searches are not excluded because the exclusionary
rule was not designed to give the individual redress for injury, "for any repara-
tion comes too late." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
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citizens from aiding in the apprehension of criminals to the utmost
of their ability.3
Cases relating to searches and seizures by airline officials at
airports indicate that there are two categories of constitutional
searches, resulting in different court imposed controls, procedures,
and consequences. The first category is the search of passengers
and their carry-on baggage prior to boarding. ' The second category
involves the opening and inspection by airline officials of packages
which have been delivered to the airline for air freight."
The first category of searches, that of passengers and their lug-
gage before boarding conducted pursuant to the anti-hijacking
program, constitutes governmental action within the reach of the
fourth amendment. In United States v. Davis," the Ninth Circuit
considered an anti-hijacking statute" together with related rules
issued under the regulatory authority of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministrator.' These rules require air carriers to implement a
screening system acceptable to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in order to prevent or deter a passenger's boarding an
3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971), rehering denied,
404 U.S. 874 (1971). But see United States v. Krell, 388 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alas.
1975), where the District Court for Alaska held that the motive of a private party
was an important consideration in determining whether a private person acted
as the agent of the State, such that if the search is motivated only by a desire
to aid law enforcement it is subject to the fourth amendment. Id. at 1375.
14See United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 957 (1977); United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 987 (1974); United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 352
F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Comment, Are
Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 131 (1978).
" See United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Pryba, 502
F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v.
DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Tripp, 468 F.2d 569
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973); Gold v. United States, 378
F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Krell, 388 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alas. 1975).
16 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
1749 U.S.C. § 1472(i)-(m) (1976) which makes aircraft hijacking and certain
related activities federal crimes.
1s 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (a)-(k) (1978).
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aircraft with sabotage devices either in carry-on baggage or on or
near his person. Furthermore, these rules forbid the transportation
of any person refusing to consent to a search of his person or
property." The court concluded that such preliminary searches
of airline passengers constituted a nationwide anti-hijacking pro-
gram conceived, directed, and implemented by federal officials in
cooperation with air carriers, and thus within the reach of the
fourth amendment." Since Davis, the Ninth Circuit" and the Sixth
Circuit' have applied fourth amendment standards to searches of
boarding passengers and their luggage.
The second category, inspections by common carriers of pack-
ages delivered for shipment, traditionally has constituted a private
search not subject to fourth amendment protection,"a unless the
19 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1978):
(k) Each certificate holder shall refuse to transport-
(1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his person
in accordance with the screening system prescribed by paragraph
(b) of this section; and
(2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a search
or inspection of that property in accordance with the screening
system prescribed by paragraph (b) of this section.
'0United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 803, 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
" See United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 867 (1976), in which a search by an airline security guard of a passen-
ger's suitcase was held to constitute state action for fourth amendment purposes
and was held to be permissible under the fourth amendment because the passen-
ger voluntarily consented to the search; United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075
(9th Cir. 1973), in which defendant's implied consent to a search of his suitcase
was a reasonable search within the safeguards of the fourth amendment.
'"See United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 957 (1977), in which defendant's implied consent based upon constructive
knowledge of the airline's right to search his baggage precluded any violation of
his fourth amendment rights. The court assumed arguendo that the requisite state
action was present. Prior to Davis, see United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180
(3d Cir. 1972), which held that within the context of a potential hijacking a
necessarily limited search with a magnetometer is not per se unreasonable under
the fourth amendment. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (where the Court
held that a pat-down weapons frisk of a suspect after an investigative stop does
not violate the fourth amendment when the officer reasonably believes the person
frisked to be armed and dangerous to the officer and others.)
' United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United
States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127
(1975); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); United States v. Cangiano, 464
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
actual participation or involvement of a government agent is
shown."4 Under the common law, carriers have the right to decline
shipment of packages when circumstances indicate the contents
are of a suspicious or possibly dangerous nature, and they may
make a search to confirm such suspicion.5 In United States v.
Pryba," an air freight clerk opened a package when the shipper
"
4 See, e.g., United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975), in which
the court held that there had been a government search where airline employees
searched a suitcase for the sole purpose of aiding the investigative work of a gov-
ernment drug agent who witnessed the search; Corngold v. United States, 367
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966), in which a search conducted by TWA employees at the
request of federal agents constituted a government search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
'United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1127 (1975); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Bruskas
v. Railway Express Agency, 172 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1949); People v. McKinnon,
7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); Brass v. Maitland, 6
Ellis & B.L. 470, 119 Eng. Rep. 940 (Q.B. 1856); Crouch v. London & N.W. Ry.,
14 Com.B. 291, 139 Eng. Rep. 105 (Com.Pleas 1854).
Fourth amendment procedures are significantly more comprehensive in their
protection against unreasonable searches than the common law rule which allows
a carrier to make an immediate determination of fact based upon his own sus-
picions. An 1845 English statute regulating railroad transportation provided:
No Person shall be entitled to carry, or to require the Company to
carry, upon the Railway, any Aquafortis, Oil of Vitriol, Gunpowder,
Lucifer Matches, or any other Goods which in the Judgement of
the Company may be of a dangerous Nature; . . . and it shall be
lawful for the Company to refuse to take any Parcel that they
may suspect to contain Goods of a dangerous Nature, or require
the same to be opened to ascertain the Fact.
An Act for consolidation in One Act certain Provisions usually inserted in Acts
authorizing the making of Railways, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 20(a), S 105.
Under the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court emphasizes that reasonable-
ness turns on the more specific commands of the amendment's warrant clause.
United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S.
297, 315 (1972). The Court has condemned searches without a warrant subject
only to exceptions for consent searches, a very limited class of routine searches,
and searches where exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impractica-
ble. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 358 (1974). Such warrants must specifically describe the place to be searched
and items to be seized, and may only be issued by a detached magistrate upon a
showing of probable cause. Id. But when flexibility of inspection as to time, place,
and frequency is a necessity, the Court has found that a regulatory inspection
search without a warrant is not unreasonable if authorized by statute. United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); (which held that in
some situations regulatory inspections authorized by statute may not proceed
without a warrant if entry is refused, but that warrants may be issued based on
the existence of an area inspection program and "reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards.")
20 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1974).
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could not identify the contents with any specificity. The search
was within the common law rule, and not subject to the fourth
amendment. 7 The court in Pryba found the justification to be the
carrier's aims to safeguard life and property and to frustrate crimi-
nality." Either objective warrants inquiry by the carrier as to the
contents of parcels tendered for shipment, and/or a reasonable in-
spection to fulfill those objectives."
In addition to the common law right, airlines may inspect pack-
ages delivered for shipment pursuant to tariffis0 filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB)." Such rules, of which the public is
deemed to have constructive notice," have been found broad
enough to authorize the search of any package which an airline
official believes does not conform to tariff weight and value regu-
lations.' While tariffs make all shipments by air subject to in-
spection by the carrier, the regulations specifically provide that
11Id. at 398.
28 Id. at 399.
9 Id.
' Rule 24 to Airline Tariff Publisher, Inc., Agent, Official Airfreight Rules
Tariff, No. 1-B, C.A.B. No. 96. The regulation provides: "Inspection of Shipments
-All shipments are subject to inspection by the carrier, but the carrier shall not
be obligated to perform such inspection."
(Tariffs are published schedules of the rules of carriage and monetary rates
charged.)
21United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Edwards, 443 F. Supp.
192 (D. Mass. 1977). Cf. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966);
See also United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973).
"2 See, e.g., Tishmen & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 306 n.14 (1976) (where the Court intimated that published
tariffs might provide sufficient notice to preclude a suit based on failure to dis-
close.)
33Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967). The purpose
of the tariff is to protect the carrier against liability. Traditionally, the carrier is
bound to accept all goods reasonably delivered to him for transportation. Crouch
v. London & N.W. Ry., 14 Com.B. 291, 139 Eng. Rep. 105 (Com.Pleas 1854).
The carrier is further liable for the goods excepting acts of God or the King's
enemies. Rily v. Horne, 5 Bing. 217, 2 M. & P. 331, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044
(Com.Pleas 1828). The tariffs regulate transportation charges based upon gross
weight, and the method for determining gross weight. For insurance purposes
they provide assumed monetary values based on weight, and provide for in-
creased transportation charges if the declared value exceeds assumed value. See
Rules 50-52 to Airline Tariff Publisher, Inc., Agent, Official Airfreight Rules
Tariff, No. 1-B, C.A.B. No. 96, supra, note 30.
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the carrier is not obligated to perform such inspection.' Because
of this permissive rather than mandatory nature, the CAB's involve-
ment in these inspections-and therefore the government's-is lim-
ited to merely accepting the tariffs as filed and providing a forum
for challenges to tariffs by either the CAB or interested parties.
Accordingly, these tariffs do not appropriate the services of com-
mon carriers for governmental purposes, and searches conducted
under them are "private."' Pryba recognized that tariffs justify
carrier searches, but held that this was ancillary to the pre-existing
common law powers of search and inspection." The court noted
that air freight carriers share a qualified right of package inspec-
tion with other common carriers of goods, and the tariffs merely
recognize that right.' The court found that the bare recognition
of this right cannot be equated with a grant of government author-
ity to search, nor can it transform an inspection initiated and con-
ducted by the carrier for its own protection into a search under
the aegis of the federal government:" such searches are private."0
In 1974 Congress enacted the Air Transportation Security
Act." Section 1511 (hereinafter referred to as the statute)' re-
quires the Administrator of the FAA to authorize airlines to con-
duct searches or inspections for the purpose of determining whether
a "dangerous weapon, explosive or other destructive substance"
is present. The statute was enacted as part of a congressional effort
Rule 24 to Airline Tariff Publisher, Inc., Agent, Official Airfreight Rules
Tariff, No. 1-B, C.A.B. No. 96, supra, note 30.
1 United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449-50, n.1 (2d Cir. 1973). The
air carrier files by tariff its transportation charges and regulations. The CAB may
only reject them if they do not conform to regulations on published form and
information. 49 U.S.C. 5 1373(a) (1976). The carrier may change a tariff after
sixty days notice. In the public interest, the CAB may allow such change upon
less notice. 49 U.S.C. 5 1373(c) (1976), as amended by Act of Nov. 9, 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-163, §5 8(a), 10(a), 91 Stat. 1281.
30 United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).





41 Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 418 (codified in 49 U.S.C. 55 1356, 1357,
1371, 1372, 1472, 1511, 1516 (1976).
449 U.S.C. S 1511 (1976). See note 3 supra.
4Id.
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to provide security against hijacking attempts through the Air
Transportation Security Act of 1974." While there is no specific
legislative history addressing section 1511, Congress' intent behind
the entire Act was "to statutorily provide security against acts of
criminal violence directed against air transportation through the
imposition at airports in the United States of such measures as
the screening of passengers and requiring the presence of ade-
quately trained law enforcement personnel."' In addition, the
security requirements of the Act' unquestionably support its stated
purpose by providing a law enforcement presence and capability
at United States airports adequate to insure safety from criminal
violence and air piracy in air transportation."" Congress decided
that these provisions were needed to ratify statutorily the security
policies and procedures that have been put in effect at United
States' airports through regulations and directives of the FAA. 8
Pryba is thus distinguishable from the present case having pre-
dated the enactment of the statute.
Faced with this legal background the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Fannon recognized the private nature of air freight
searches, in the absence of government authorization or involve-
ment," but found in the statute the requisite government authoriza-
tion to invoke fourth amendment protections for all airline
searches." The court noted that the statute is more than a declara-
tion of the private non-governmental common law and tariff rights
to search, 1 because it was passed as part of a congressional effort
4H. R. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 28 reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3975, 4010.
"H.R. REP. No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3975.
1 Title II was added by the committee to deal with security at air-
ports in the United States. It requires that all passengers and all
property be screened by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities
employed or operated by employees of the air carrier; that the
carrier refuse to transport anyone who does not consent to a search;
and that a law enforcement prsence and capability be maintained
at airports by airport operators.
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3977.
"I Id. at 4008.
4"Id.
"United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d at 963.
50Id. at 965.
61 Id. at 964.
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to provide security against criminal violence in air transportation."2
The statute involves air carriers in the detection and seizure of
weapons and explosives, threats to public safety which the police
traditionally have been relied upon to combat."3 The court took ju-
dicial notice of the danger presented by air shipments of explosives,
and was confronted with explicit statutory language authorizing
air carriers to refuse carriage when consent to a personal or prop-
erty search is not given." Deciding without further explanation it
was "not unreasonable to conclude" that Congress intended to
include air freight shipments in the government's air transporta-
tion security scheme,' the court held that Congress conferred on
air carriers a governmental function subject to constitutional limi-
tations." The statute supplants any private powers of search and
subjects such searches to the fourth amendment's standard of
reasonableness."7 The present search was unreasonable because
defendants could not have consented having no notice that search
was a condition of carriage."
The court's holding renders all searches by air carriers to be
governmental searches regardless of whether there was in fact
participation by government agents. Such a broad construction of
the statute contradicts both its express purpose and intended appli-
cation. While the statute on its face authorizes the inspection of
property for transportation, the legislative history suggests that
Congress did not intend to include air freight within its parameters,
but rather baggage and packages accompanying boarding passen-
gers." The Act deals solely with aircraft piracy" which it defines
as "any seizure or exercise of control of an aircraft in flight by
force or violence or threat of force or violence and with wrongful





W Id. at 965.
57Id.
58 Id.
"' See United States v. Edwards, 443 F. Supp. 192, 198-99 (D. Mass. 1977).
60See generally H. R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 7, reprinted in
11961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2563, 2567; H. R. REP. No. 885, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 3975, 3976.
6149 U.S.C. S 1472(i)(2) (1976).
1979] CASENOTES
carrier of the person attempting to gain control of the plane." To
that extent, shipment by air freight, even of an explosive, does not
present a threat of hijacking or air piracy."
Secondly, conceding that the Act authorizes searches of air
freight, the statute does not authorize such searches when the sole
purpose is to find secreted narcotics. Section (a) of the statute
specifically authorizes searches of persons and property for the
purpose of determining the unlawful presence of "a dangerous
weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance."" In addition,
this section authorizes the carrier to refuse transportation of a pas-
senger or property when in the carrier's opinion such transportation
would or might be inimical to the safety of the flight.' Section (b)
of the statute only authorizes the carrier to refuse transportation
when consent to search is not given for the purposes enumerated
in section (a). Only by an extremely broad and somewhat creative
construction of "destructive substance"" can the statute be inter-
preted to authorize air carriers to refuse transportation when the
sole object of the search is to locate hidden narcotics. Such a con-
struction is not supported by a legislative history that deals with
aircraft hijacking."
61United States v. Edwards, 443 F. Supp. 192, 198 (D. Mass. 1977).
6Id. at 199. In support of the view that the statute was not intended to cover
air freight, the sole regulation promulgated by the Administrator of the FAA
under section 1511 authorizes the search of passengers and their carry-on or
checked baggage. It does not explicitly provide for inspection of air freight ex-
cept insofar as shipped materials might be considered "checked baggage." 14
C.F.R. S 121.538 (1978) provides in part:
(b) Each certificate holder shall adopt and put into use a screening
system, acceptable to the Administrator, that is designed to prevent
or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or in-
cendiary device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about the
persons of passengers, except as provided in S 121.585, and the
carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked baggage.
(k) Each certificate holder shall refuse to transport-
(1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his person
in accordance with the screening system prescribed by paragraph
(b) of this section; and
(2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a search
or inspection of that property in accordance with the screening
system prescribed by paragraph (b) of this section.
449 U.S.C. § 1511(a)(1) (1976).
"See 49 U.S.C § 1511(a) (1976).
66d., § 1511(b).
"7 See note 45 supra.
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Since the statute was not intended to cover air freight, nor any
search for illegal narcotics, it appears the search in Fannon ex-
ceeded both the purpose and intended application of the statute.
Therefore the statute's governmental authorization is not applicable
to the facts of the case or to any invocation of fourth amendment
protection." The court's holding to the contrary is incorrect. The
carrier's authorization to search in this case must lie elsewhere.'
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Fannon apparently places it in
conflict with the Sixth Circuit. In United States v. Freeland,"* de-
cided after Fannon, an airline passenger and his luggage were
searched prior to boarding and an illegally concealed handgun was
found. The Sixth Circuit held that since the passenger had given
consent to search, the presence or absence of state action was not
at issue.' In dicta, however, the court stated it did "not believe
that all searches of passengers' luggage at airports are invariably
subject to the proscription of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the
question of governmental involvement in the search is determined
by the particular facts at hand."" The statute is addressed to this
exact situation yet the Sixth Circuit does not find sufficient gov-
ernmental authorization to invoke the fourth amendment." The
Ninth Circuit holds that the statute automatically triggers the
fourth amendment"" in a situation to which the statute was not
"Even applying fourth amendment protections to the case at hand, it is de-
batable whether the search in question was so unreasonable as to be violative of
the amendment. The court held that as a threshold matter the search had to be
preceded by reasonable notice to the shipper that search was a condition of car-
riage. 556 F.2d at 965. This notice could take various forms but would be deemed
reasonable if sufficient to apprise the ordinary shipper of the condition. Id.
However, the shipper already has notice by operation of law of the carrier's
right to inspect shipments for conformance with tariff regulations. See note 32
supra; see also United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 957 (1977). Either searches for contraband or unlawful possession of
weapons are within the broad category of "nonconformity with tariff regulations."
It is arguable that the defendants had reasonable notice in this case.
" See notes 25, 30 supra.
70562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977).
7' Id. at 385-386.
" Id. at 385. The court went on to state that "[it was . .. incumbent upon
[the defendant] to demonstrate that sufficient governmental involvement existed
to invoke the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
"' Id. at 384. It is peculiar that the court in its dicta never mentions the statute
or its implications, yet earlier in the opinion reference is made to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Fannon. See generally 562 F.2d at 385.
7 See U.S. v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1977).
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intended to apply. Such a conflict between the circuits only con-
fuses the applicable law in an area of paramount importance in
airport searches.
Nor does excluding the illegally obtained evidence from trial
achieve any significant purpose in this case. The basic justifica-
tion for excluding illegally obtained evidence is to deter the ex-
cesses of law officers who have a professional interest in the out-
come of their investigations. ' It is unlikely that air freight clerks
will be significantly affected in their actions by any court imposing
or declining to impose the exclusionary rule." Upon rehearing the
Ninth Circuit should reverse its decision in Fannon and find that
the search was in fact private in nature and outside the protection
of the fourth amendment.
Craig Weinlein
ISee Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 484-85, 496-502 (1976) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
"See United States v. Fannon, 569 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1978) (Cham-
bers, J. dissenting).
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